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As budget and force reductions continue, Navy recruiting must become more
efficient, using fewer dollars and resources. In an effort toward achieving this goal,
this thesis proposes two procedures to evaluate the efficiency of Navy recruiting.
Both procedures are based on two Data Envelopment analysis models. One procedure
assumes that all inputs are discretionary and the other does not. To demonstrate
their effectiveness, the two procedures were implemented in the General Algebraic
Modeling System (GAMS) and used to analyze the efficiency of recruiting districts
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Budget downsizing will continue to force reductions in the total number
of personnel serving in the United Sates Navy. As a result, fewer billets will
need to be filled. It might seem that this would make recruiting easier. In
reality, maintaining an adequate (all volunteer) national defense will require
that remaining billets be filled by the best qualified young people. Attracting
these higher quality enlistees demands that recruiting efforts be ever more
concentrated on a smaller eligible pool. Furthermore, the ability of the Navy
to effectively compete in the recruiting market is under increasing challenge
from the other Services and private industry. To meet this challenge, Navy
recruiting must be efficient as well as effective.
A. BACKGROUND
Commander Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC), headquartered in
Arlington, Virginia, was responsible for recruiting over 130,000 individuals in
1991. Accomplishing this required a budget of some 400 million dollars and a
"sales force" of more than 4000 recruiters. These salespeople are distributed
throughout the geographic United States, which is divided into five recruiting
areas, and further subdivided into 41 districts. Districts are split into 287
zones, and the zones are split into 1283 stations. Stations then provide face to
face sales effort for United States Navy recruiting.
This thesis focuses on measuring the efficiency of recruiting efforts at the
district level. Of particular interest is the comparison of Navy efforts with
those of the Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force. Unlike production entities in
industry, recruiting efficiency is not readily quantified using traditional concepts
such as prices and production functions. First, recruiting districts are by nature
not-for-profit organizations. Second, the "products" or "outputs" of recruiting
districts are the numbers of each "quality category" ofyoung people who enlist.
So it is difficult, and subjective at best, to associate a monetary value with each
recruit category in order to compare district efficiencies on the same (absolute)
scale. In order to avoid entirely the issue of setting an absolute scale, this
thesis employs Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), originally proposed by
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978).
B. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II provides background on DEA. Specifically, two DEA models are
examined. The first assumes that resources used in recruiting are
discretionary, the second model treats some resources as non-discretionary.
Chapter III uses each of the two models to analyze and compare Navy
recruiting efforts to those of the Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force. Finally,
Chapter IV summarizes the thesis and provides suggestions for future
investigation.
H. DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS (DEA)
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) proposed Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) as a method with which to evaluate the efficiency of Decision Making
Units (DMUs). Their term DMU emphasizes the not-for-profit nature of the
entities under consideration. The concept of efficiency used in DEA is based
on the ratio of outputs to inputs for a given DMU. Outputs refer to the
products, benefits or outcomes created by a given DMU. Inputs are simply the
resources used in creating these outputs. In some cases, inputs are further
segregated into two categories. One category encompasses inputs which can be
controlled by a DMU and are referred to in the literature as "discretionary".
The other category of inputs is referred to as "non-discretionary", since their
levels are beyond the decision maker's control.
The idea of efficiency as a ratio of outputs to inputs has intuitive appeal.
A greater ratio represents more output per input, i.e., higher efficiency. This
natural appeal has motivated researchers to study and extend DEA models in
various directions. Of particular interest here is the work of Banker and Morey
(1986) who extended the basic DEA model, to allow for the discrimination
between discretionary and non-discretionary inputs. Other applications ofDEA
to evaluate organizational efficiency include hospital production (Banker, et al.,
1986), Electric Cooperatives (Thomas, 1986), U.S. Air Force Equipment
Maintenance (Charnes, et al., 1985), U.S. Army Recruiting (Charnes 1990),
Program Follow Through (Charnes, et al., 1981), School efficiency (Bessent, et
al., 1980) and others. These are only a few examples. A comprehensive
bibliography (Seiford 1990) listed over 400 publications related to DEA.
The next sections address two basic DEA models. The first assumes that
all inputs are discretionary, the second that some inputs are beyond the DMU's
control. Each section begins by describing a DEA model as it appears in the
literature. However, when the models are applied to the measurement of
organizational efficiency, there are some inconsistencies. To overcome them,
alternative procedures are proposed.
A. MODEL WITH ALL INPUTS DISCRETIONARY
To begin, define the following
Indices:
d index of DMU where d = l,...,n and n = total number of DMUs
i index of inputs where i = l,...,r and r = the number of (different)
inputs
j index of outputs where j = l,...,p and p = the number of (different)
outputs
Problem data:
Xtf amount of input i used by I)MU d
yjd amount of outputj produced by DMU d
Using the above notation, DEA defines efficiency based on a ratio of weighted





Uj = weight assigned to output j
y, = weight assigned to input i
Zd = the ratio of outputs to inputs for DMU d
Note that weights Uj and u, together can be thought of as factors which convert
outputs and inputs of different types (and scales) to one universal measure. In
DEA methodology, each DMU is allowed to choose its own weights. If all
DMUs were required to use the same weights in calculating their ratios, it
would in effect be like assigning values (e.g., costs or prices) to each input and
output. But assignment of costs/prices is inappropriate, particularly to outputs,
in the not-for-profit setting. Weights Uj and v
t
are not, however, chosen
arbitrarily. In particular, they must satisfy the following criteria:
1) All weights must be positive, i.e., Uj > and u, > for all i and j.
2) No DMU's ratio is allowed to exceed a value of one using a given set of
weights.
Thus, to determine how efficient a given DMU is, DEA selects that set of
weights which maximize the DMU's ratio, while satisfying both criteria. More
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. > for j = 1 , . . . , r
v, > for i = 1 , . . .
, p
Note, the first constraint ensures that criterion two is satisfied, and can be
equivalently written as
P r
E UA s E v^ for d = l,...,n.
This makes the constraint linear. The objective function, however, is still
nonlinear and can be shown to be both pseudo-convex and pseudo-concave (see,
e.g., Bazaraa and Shetty, 1979).
If the solution to the optimization problem, DEA1, yields a ratio of one,
i.e., Zk = 1, then DMU k is considered to be efficient. IfZk < 1, then DMU k
is inefficient and Zk represents an "efficiency ratio". However, there are no
optimization procedures that can effectively handle the last two sets of
constraints in DEAL To apply existing procedures to DEA1, the strict
inequalities must be relaxed, thereby allowing the weights to be zero.
However, zero weights do not provide answers consistent with the definition
of efficiency.
To illustrate, consider an example with six DMU's. Each uses one unit of
input to produce two types of output. The data for these notional DMUs is
displayed in Table 1.
TABLE 1: AN EXAMPLE PROBLEM























FIGURE 1: Data from the Example Problem
Figure 1 graphically displays the data in Table 1. Note that only output
amounts are plotted, since each DMU uses a single unit of input. Applying
problem DEA1 (with zero weights allowed) to the above data yields the
following ratios: Z} = Z2 = Z3 = Z4 = 1.0, and Z5 = Z6 = 0.8. (Table 2
provides the complete results.)
TABLE 2: DEA1 SOLUTION TO THE EXAMPLE PROBLEM
WEIGHTS
DMU Vi Ui u2 z
1 1.0000 0.1336 0.0324 1.0000
2 1.0000 0.1250 0.0625 1.0000
3 1.0000 0.0714 0.1429 1.0000
4 1.0000 0.0000 0.2000 1.0000
5 1.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.8000
6 1.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.8000
Unfortunately, these results suggest that DMU 4 is efficient. Compared
to DMU 3, DMU 4 produces one fewer units of output one. Clearly then, DMU
4 is not efficient. This incorrect efficiency ratio is due to the fact that in order
to achieve a ratio equal to 1.0 for DMU 4, u } is set to zero, u2 to 0.2 and v2 to
1. Then,
Z4 =
°' 3 +0 - 2 ' 5
=1.0
To reveal another inaccuracy, compare Z6 and Z6 . DMU 5 produces 3 and
4 units of outputs one and two, respectively, while DMU 6 produces 4 units of
output two and none of output one. Intuitively, we expect that DMU 6 is
substantially less efficient than DMU 5. However, DEA1 yields values for Z6
and Z6 which indicate they have the same efficiency.
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In order to overcome the deficiency of allowing weights to be zero,
Charnes and Cooper (1985) replaced the last two sets of constraints in DEA1
with
Uj a e and v
i
2 e
where e is a small, (non-archimedian) constant, generally set to 10"6 in the
literature. While this constant solves the problem of identifying efficient
DMUs, it causes the ratio, Zd , for inefficient DMUs to be unusable as an
efficiency rating when some weights assume the value of e. That is, u, = e for
some j and/or Vj = e for some i. In particular, under this e-modification,
m 36 + (1/5 - 6)5 = ! _ 2eJ4 1
3e + (1/5 - e)4
Z< = Zl L±Lz li-Z =0.8-e
1
Z6 =
(1/5^-6)4 =QQ _ 4£
As before, these numbers do not reflect the true efficiency for the
corresponding DMUs. For small values of e, Z4 is almost 1, indicating that
DMU 4 is close to being efficient. Similarly, Z5 and Z6 are approximately the
same when e is small. So, DMUs 5 and 6 have approximately the same
efficiency. These conclusions are similar to those obtained when zero weights
are allowed. As in the efficient DMU cases, these efficiency ratio values are
inaccurate when e is set to 10"6 . To ensure that the ratios are accurate for
11
nonefficient DMUs, we propose the following alternative procedure for
computing an efficiency rating.
An Alternative Procedure





f . . . , U*, vf, . . . , v*) as the optimal set of weights for DMU
k.
Step 2: Discard all weight sets in which some of the weights are zero. Let
L be a set of indices of the remaining sets of weights, i.e.,
L = {k : uf > and v* > for all i and j)
Step 3: Recalculate ratios for all DMUs as follows:
p
k
Zd = max { ill : k e L)
Table 3 displays the efficiency ratings for the example problem. Note that
they conform more closely to intuition. In particular, the efficiency rating for
DMU 5 now reflects the fact that it is more efficient than DMU 6.
Figure 2 shows the efficient frontier based on the alternative procedure.
Using this frontier, the efficiency ratings in Table 3 can be graphically
calculated as in Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) and Charnes and Cooper
(1985). To illustrate, the efficiency ratio for DMU 4 is simply the ratio of the
12
TABLE 3: SOLUTION USING THE ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE
WEIGHTS
DMU Vi Ul u2 Z
1 1.0000 0.1336 0.0324 1.0000
2 1.0000 0.1250 0.0625 1.0000
3 1.0000 0.0714 0.1429 1.0000
4 1.0000 0.0714 0.1429 0.9286
5 1.0000 0.0714 0.1429 0.7857
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FIGURE 2: Graph of 6 DMU Example with Adjusted Frontier
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length of the line segment from the origin to DMU 4 and the length of the line
segment from the origin to the efficiency frontier passing through DMU 4, i.e.,
\/3 . 2 + 5 . 2 n ^ or-Z4 =
v
- 0.925.
\/3.4 2 + 5.3 2
B. MODEL WITH MIXED INPUTS
In practice, many inputs may be critical to a DMU but beyond a decision
maker's control. In the literature, these inputs are referred to as non-
discretionary inputs. At a recruiting district, these non-discretionary inputs
typically include the unemployment rate, the populations of 17-21 year-olds,
and propensity to enlist. Neglecting to discriminate between discretionary and
non-discretionary inputs may leave valuable DEA results undiscovered.
Specifically, DEA can provide information about how a DMU should adjust the
level of its inputs or outputs in order to become more efficient. By treating
discretionary and non-discretionary inputs similarly, as in DEA1, it is implicitly
assumed that non-discretionary input levels can be varied by the decision
maker, which is not the case. Banker and Morey (1986) modified DEA1 to
handle non-discretionary variables as follows:
New indices:
i index for discretionary inputs where i = l,...,r and r = the number
of discretionary inputs,
f index for non-discretionary inputs where f = l,...,q and q = the
number of non-discretionary inputs.
14
To evaluate DMU k, one solves the following optimization problem:
[DEA2]:
Wk = maximize




E w* - E vjXj»
±1 tl si for d=l, . . . ,n
r
E v^«
Uj > for j = 1 , . . . ,p
v
t
> for i = 1 , . . . , r
vy s for f = 1 , . . . , q
DEA2 differs from DEA1 in two important ways. First, v
f
is required only
to be nonnegative. Second, the weighted sum of the non-discretionary inputs
is subtracted from the weighted sum of outputs in the numerator. In effect,
this cancels that portion of the outputs which was caused by non-discretionary
inputs. The remaining outputs must be the result of discretionary inputs.
Hence, the ratio now represents controllable outputs over controllable inputs.
The problem with requiring Uj and v
t
to be positive still exists, just as it
did in DEAL It can be solved here in a similar fashion, involving only a change
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in Step 3 of the alternative procedure. For the case involving mixed inputs
then, Step 3 should read as follows:
Step 3: Recalculate the ratios for all DMUs as follows:
P 9
E uj yjd - E v/kxj»
Wd = maximize {iii tl : k e L} .
Then, using the results from both alternative procedures, one from DEA1 and
the other from DEA2, the efficiency ratio for DMU d with mixed inputs is the
maximum of Zd and Wd .
16
m. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
To evaluate the efficiency of Navy recruiting districts, DEA1, DEA2 and
the corresponding alternative procedures were implemented in GAMs, a
mathematical solver of optimization models (see, Brooke et al., 1988). For this
study, Navy recruiting districts were considered DMUs. Inputs for these
districts consist of the number of recruiters, the unemployment rate and
population size for the district, and outputs consist of the number of recruits
(contracts) enlisted in categories 1-3A and 3B. Navy Recruiting Command
extracted the necessary data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)
database for the years 1987 to 1990. The corresponding data for the Marine
Corps, Army and Air Force are based on the geography of Navy recruiting
districts.
A. RESULTS WITH DISCRETIONARY INPUTS
To provide a basis for later comparison, the non-discretionary inputs, i.e.,
unemployment rate and population size, are not considered in this section.
Table 4 displays the number of contracts per recruiter in each district for 1987.
These data are depicted graphically in Figure 3. Solving problem DEA1 with
1987 data and only requiring the weights to be nonnegative yields no usable
efficiency ratios because the model produced at least one zero weight for every
17
TABLE 4: NUMBER OF CONTRACTS PER RECRUITER IN 1987
NAVY MARINES ARMY AIR FORCE
D A B A B A B A B
1 11.2763 4.6379 14.6395 3.7327 10.1652 3.3124 13.4927 7.9989
2 9.7288 4.7256 12.9208 3.2946 10.6701 3.0828 15.5892 10.1638
3 15.2676 5.9550 17.7942 4.1359 15.1648 4.6492 16.0468 8.2573
4 10.8101 8.2278 6.8201 1.9382 11.1746 6.5891 19.1325 17.4699
5 16.0215 5.3405 16.6494 4.1002 12.0000 4.9636 15.6482 6.5962
6 11.0070 6.4356 10.9692 2.6462 9.1306 4.6556 15.2207 9.4474
7 12.9679 6.2855 18.4298 5.6129 12.7781 6.3759 16.9441 8.1096
8 9.5099 5.7465 8.8695 2.5418 8.8337 4.2954 13.9755 9.6942
9 14.5268 6.6633 12.3620 3.0215 11.1886 6.0646 18.0680 11.3741
10 13.3333 9.8480 16.1329 5.8952 16.2619 11.7678 18.6153 10.8207
11 13.4825 11.2303 14.6410 5.6585 14.9177 12.0615 20.5827 11.3722
12 15.4297 6.1719 21.5076 5.2238 18.9187 8.1135 31.5026 14.1278
13 15.3199 11.4175 11.7588 4.0478 16.6981 11.1164 20.2283 10.6651
14 13.8317 7.4515 13.8235 5.0737 16.1471 6.7156 20.2863 10.9202
15 13.4921 9.5447 14.3688 5.7535 14.0432 10.2258 19.0325 11.1143
16 11.9197 6.6493 13.7232 3.3483 15.2384 8.9502 20.7992 6.25
17 14.8608 6.9050 16.5236 5.5877 17.7125 8.5924 18.5100 12.9032
18 15.5725 6.3225 7.9376 1.5775 12.3300 4.8596 10.1183 6.6272
19 19.0360 9.3712 16.8285 4.5378 14.8794 7.6455 18.3457 8.8642
20 16.3006 8.2007 16.7567 5.0855 14.5785 7.0083 15.0716 9.7749
21 14.5100 8.6530 12.0946 2.9706 12.4843 6.5801 23.1010 13.6282
22 17.1062 8.5420 13.0105 3.5056 14.0701 6.1388 19.7913 10.9727
23 18.8269 5.7711 16.6608 3.7921 12.2227 3.5965 17.0936 8.3116
24 22.9743 7.2655 19.1440 4.2027 14.0466 4.6915 21.6904 8.6303
25 14.6116 6.3967 19.6106 4.6824 14.4627 5.7406 14.4527 8.4949
26 17.7822 6.0651 15.6772 2.7973 13.8799 3.6770 20.6623 10.7623
27 14.4817 6.4817 16.0101 4.7163 15.0742 7.0031 20.6179 11.4146
28 21.2169 7.9191 17.2316 4.0892 16.9044 5.2931 21.2273 8.9927
29 18.8588 7.8090 13.3950 2.9886 16.7025 5.9973 20.9800 9.5623
30 21.9089 10.9545 20.2950 5.6815 17.0399 8.4266 19.9607 9.0954
31 19.2031 8.5454 15.4520 4.321 17.8593 7.9899 27.5779 11.1111
32 19.6972 10.9641 14.9373 4.2621 18.4468 8.6277 37.7904 18.7535
33 17.3518 8.7127 21.1646 7.0204 17.2375 9.3737 19.7755 11.0681
34 19.5787 11.7048 15.3887 5.464 18.2074 13.3636 32.4838 12.9750
35 18.9019 10.0631 24.2121 6.6615 16.6511 8.6522 28.1521 10.2502
36 12.8886 12.4914 13.7288 6.3347 12.6548 11.9490 13.0711 10.6599
37 15.1734 10.0148 8.1009 1.9662 13.4058 5.6087 16.3483 10.4608
38 19.5164 7.1052 14.1891 3.3819 17.7738 4.9194 24.6903 9.7378
39 16.0267 8.9549 11.3292 3.1271 12.5146 4 . 9928 16.4484 8.6803
40 22.1787 6.2824 14.8571 3.0037 16.7374 4.3578 20.2972 9.8169
41 15.7737 7.0511 13.4215 2.7615 18.0214 5.8546 28.4775 14.8138
D - district
A " (no. of 1-3A contracts) + (no. of recruiters)
B " (no. of 3B contracts) + (no. of recruiters)
district. This is also evident in Figure 3 which suggests that Air Force district
32 is the only efficient district among a total of 164 districts. To make the
results from DEA1 more meaningful, Air Force district 32 is treated as "super
18
efficient" and is removed from the model. Without Air Force district 32, the
alternative procedure produced the efficiency ratings in Table 5. Note that the
efficiency rating for Air Force district 32 is larger than one to indicate its status
as being super efficient. Based on these efficiency ratings, Figure 4 shows the
corresponding efficiency frontier which is completely defined by Air Force
districts. Being super efficient, Air Force district 32 lies above the frontier. To
compare Navy recruiting efforts against those of the Air Force, data points for
Army and Marine Corps districts are removed in Figure 5.
1987 RAW DATA
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FIGURE 3: Number of Contracts per Recruiter in 1987
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Data from 1988 through 1990 were analyzed in a similar manner and the
results are summarized in Figure 6. From this figure, it is clear that Air Force
districts dominate those from the other services in the first three years. In
1990, Navy districts are slightly more efficient than Air Force districts on
average.
TABLE 5: 1987 EFFICIENCY RATINGS
DISTRICT NAVY MARINES ARMY AIR FORCE
1 0.3498 0.4093 0.2983 0.5143
2 0.3248 0.3613 0.3054 0.635
3 0.4672 0.4897 0.4393 0.5562
4 0.4924 0.1946 0.4244 1.0
5 0.4725 0.4627 0.3727 0.4885
6 0.4156 0.3038 0.3146 0.5989
7 0.4324 0.5332 0.4341 0.5604
8 0.3673 0.2535 0.2952 0.595
9 0.4677 0.3431 0.4014 0.718
10 0.5941 0.4859 £.7139 0.7001
11 0.657 0.447 0.7108 0.748
12 0.4752 0.5963 0.5933 1.0
13 0.6872 0.3493 0.6903 0.7125
14 0.4942 0.4168 0.5023 0.7245
15 0.5826 0.4426 0.6193 0.7181
16 0.436 0.3808 0.5772 0.6001
17 0.4824 0.4889 0.5909 0.7909
18 0.4814 0.2132 0.3783 0.4135
19 0.6411 0.4754 0.5153 0.6105
20 0.5568 0.4844 0.4835 0.6116
21 0.5554 0.336 0.4396 0.8777
22 0.5815 0.3675 0.4433 0.7209
23 0.5454 0.4569 0.3511 0.5711
24 0.6699 0.522 0.4144 0.6671
25 0.4608 0.5421 0.4445 0.5477
26 0.5271 0.4149 0.3908 0.722
27 0.4594 0.46 0.4892 0.7503
28 0.6423 0.4758 0.4919 0.6635
29 0.586 0.3662 0.501 0.6728
30 0.7453 0.5774 0.5756 0.64
31 0.6083 0.4395 0.5665 0.8508
32 0.7194 0.4265 0.6012 1.2794
33 0.5919 0.6235 0.6198 0.7249
34 0.7507 0.4604 0.8076 1.0
35 0.6701 0.6865 0.5809 0.8472
36 0.7056 0.4437 0.6788 0.6269
37 0.6234 0.2246 0.4177 0.6572
38 0.5873 0.3921 0.5045 0.7577
39 0.5868 0.3214 0.3851 0.5797
40 0.6324 0.4001 0.4697 0.6759
41 0.5003 0.3623 0.5285 0.9942
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FIGURE 6: Average Recruiting Efficiency Based on DEA1
B. RESULTS WITH MIXED INPUTS
In addition to the non-discretionary inputs listed above, the models used
in this section also include the propensity to enlist. Values of propensity to
enlist for each service were extracted from the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey
(YATS) and are assumed to be constant over all districts. In the first attempt,
all non-discretionary inputs were treated as discretionary and DEA1 was used
to compute efficiency. This provided no usable efficiency ratings because DEA1
again produced zero weights for every district. Moreover, the additional inputs
make the identification of super efficient districts impossible. Thus, this
22
approach was abandoned. Below, we provide the results from the alternative
procedure based on DEA2.
Table 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8 summarize the results for 1987 using the
alternative procedure based on DEA2. Note that the new efficiency ratings
indicate that on the average Navy and Air Force districts have comparable
efficiency. In particular, Figure 7 shows that more districts from services other
than the Air Force he on the efficiency frontier. Figure 9 compares average
efficiency ratings over the four years. Note that the Navy, Army and Air Force
districts are comparable, perhaps with the Navy having a slight edge over the
other two services.
23
TABLE 6: 1987 ADJUSTED EFFICIENCY
DISTRICT NAVY MARINES ARMY AIR FORC1
1 0.4925 0.5205 0.4775 0.5143
2 0.5187 0.596 0.5589 0.8259
3 0.7042 0.6849 0.7023 0.5562
4 0.7111 0.1946 . 6295 1.0
5 0.7178 0.615 0.5667 0.4885
6 0.5879 0.3305 0.3805 0.5989
7 0.5909 0.7575 0.6132 0.5662
8 0.4486 0.2535 0.3958 0.595
9 0.6811 0.4532 1.0 0.7213
10 0.728 0.5966 0.9068 0.7102
11 0.8269 0.5353 0.9233 0.7911
12 0.8002 0.857 1.0 1.0
13 0.9601 0.3762 1.0 0.7216
14 0.6482 0.4903 0.7466 0.7245
15 0.8733 0.5791 1.0 0.7275
16 0.5171 0.4621 0.8147 0.6001
17 0.6476 0.6416 1.0 0.8335
18 0.6466 0.2132 0.5602 0.4135
19 0.9515 0.6502 0.7621 0.622
20 0.8452 0.6619 0.7673 0.615
21 0.8865 0.4576 0.7043 0.9008
22 1.0 0.5365 1 0.7802
23 0.8088 0.58 0.5446 0.5711
24 1.0 0.7589 0.6794 0.6827
25 0.5726 0.7212 0.7218 0.5477
26 0.7191 0.5363 0.6552 0.7233
27 0.6689 0.6039 0.7298 0.7708
28 0.9419 0.6086 0.7692 0.6635
29 0.7931 0.3985 0.8128 0.6728
30 1.0 0.7874 0.7894 0.64
31 0.8425 0.5138 0.8681 0.8508
32 0.9472 0.5094 0.8789 1.2949
33 0.8382 0.8416 0.886 0.7249
34 1.0 0.6018 1.0 1.0
35 0.841 1.0 0.7659 0.8543
36 0.8746 0.5177 1.0 0.6459
37 1.0 0.2918 1.0 0.6653
38 0.9064 0.5044 0.8168 0.7577
39 1.0 0.4806 0.6552 0.6132
40 1.0 0.5358 0.7729 0.6759
41 0.8734 0.4813 0.8872 1.0
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FIGURE 8: 1987 Adjusted Efficiency Frontier for Navy and Air Force
Districts
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FIGURE 9: Average Recruiting Efficiency Based on DEA2
C. OTHER APPLICATIONS
Besides using the results from DEA models to identify the causes and/or
methods to remedy inefficient districts, a graphical representation such as the
one in Figure 10 also indicates recruiting practices of the different Services.
This figure clearly points out that in 1990 Navy recruiting efforts were focused
on Type 3B contracts, whereas the Air Force's efforts focused on Type 1-3A
contracts. In trying to fill billets with the best recruits, the graph suggests that
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FIGURE 10: 1990 Adjusted Frontier for Navy and Air Force Districts
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis provides procedures for analyzing the efficiency of recruiting
efforts based on two DEA models. One model treats all inputs as discretionary
and the other does not. The two procedures were implemented in GAMS and
used to analyze the efficiency of recruiting districts from the four services,
Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Air Force, in the years 1987 to 1990. The two
procedures gave two drastically different results. However, the procedure
based on DEA2 was a more general model and may have provided a more
accurate assessment of recruiting efficiency.
The results from this study also identify applications which should be
further explored. Below is a list of a few applications:
1) The procedures described in this thesis can be used to analyze efficiency
of zones and stations.
2) The levels of inputs and outputs from efficient districts, zones and stations
can be used in the restructuring or realignment of the recruiting
organization.
3) The efficiency ratings produced by the procedures can be used as a
management tool, for inefficient units (districts, zones and stations)
deserve management attention during budget downsizing.
28
LIST OF REFERENCES
Banker, R. D., Conrad, R. F., and Straus, R. P., "A Comparative Application of
DEA and Translog Methods: An Illustrative Study of Hospital Production",
Management Science, v. 32, pp. 30-44, 1986.
Banker, R. D., and Morey, R., "Efficiency Analysis for Exogenously Fixed Inputs
and Outputs", Operations Research, v. 34, no. 4, pp. 513-521, 1986.
Bazaraa, M. S., and Shetty, C. M., Nonlinear Programming Theory and
Algorithms, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1979.
Bessent, A., and Bessent, W., "Determining the Comparative Efficiency of
Schools Through Data Envelopment Analysis", Educational Administration
Quarterly, v. 16, pp. 57-75, Spring, 1980.
Brooke, A., Kendrick, D., and Meeraus, A., GAMS: A User's Guide, Scientific
Press, 1988.
Charnes, A., Clark, C. T., Cooper, W. W., and Golany, B., "A Developmental
Study of Data Envelopment Analysis in Measuring the Efficiency of
Maintenance Units in the U. S. Air Forces", Annals of Operations Research, v.
2, pp. 95-112, 1985.
Charnes, A., and Cooper, W. W., "Preface to Topics in Data Envelopment
Analysis", Annals of Operations Research, v. 2, pp. 59-94, 1985.
Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W., and Rhodes, E., "Measuring the Efficiency of
Decision Making Units", European Journal of Operational Research, v. 2, pp.
429-444, 1978.
Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W., and Rhodes, E., "Evaluating Program and
Managerial Efficiency: An Application of Data Envelopment Analysis to
Program Follow Through", Management Science, v. 27, pp. 668-687, 1981.
Charnes, A., Research and Studies Division, U. S. Army Recruiting Command,
Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, USAREC SR 90-2, Measuring the
Impact of Advertising on Army Recruiting: Data Envelopment Analysis and
Advertising Effectiveness, July 1990.
29
Seiford, L., "A Bibliography of Data Envelopment Analysis", Department of
Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, MA, 01003, 1990.
30
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 524
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
3. Professor Siriphong Lawphongpanich
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School, Code OR/LP
Monterey, California 93943-5000
4. Professor Linda Gorman
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School, Code AS/GR
Monterey, California 93943-5000





6. LT Jeffrey M. Springer
3224 North Peebly Dr.









S6^ 0<; 45 Springer
Ct l An interservice com-
parison of recruiting
efficiency using data
envelopment analysis.

